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Abstract In this paper we will show how knowledge intensive firms can quicken their
internationalisation by using the Internet as a sales channel. When properly applied the
Internet can provide a way to decrease the effects of liability of foreignness and resource
scarcity, and herewith contribute to an increased speed of internationalisation. The focus of
the empirical research is on a Finnish knowledge intensive company and the development of
its international operations and sales channels. The study applies the longitudinal case study
method when examining in-depth the development of Futuremark Corporation for a period
of five years.
Keywords International new venture . Internet . Sales channel . Speed of
internationalisation . Resource scarcity . Liability of foreignness
Introduction
Adoption of international perspectives and strategies has become indispensable for knowl-
edge intensive firms (Karagozoglu and Lindell, 1998). Among others, limited opportunity
windows and the significant threat of imitation create a need for pre-emptive international-
isation: knowledge intensive firms must be international from the inception or risk facing
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a disadvantage to organisations that are international already. Early and rapid internation-
alisation is especially important for software firms, which need to develop international
mechanisms to protect their commercial value from expropriation (Oviatt and McDougall,
1994).
Internationalisation is slowed down by liability of foreignness and resource scarcity of
the knowledge intensive new firms. The speed of internationalisation is paramount for these
firms. In this study we address this important research problem; how can these firms overcome
the slowing effects of resource scarcity and liability of foreignness. In particular, our main
research question will centre on how and under which conditions knowledge intensive new
firms can use Internet as a sales channel to increase their speed of internationalisation. A
knowledge intensive firm is defined as a firm which depends on the knowledge inherent in its
activities and outputs as a source of competitive advantage. Knowledge intensity differentiates
a subset of sustainable international new firms from those likely to be less successful (Oviatt
and McDougall, 1994).
The study uses case study methodology and consists of an in-depth case description and
analysis of the internationalisation of a young software firm, Futuremark Corporation. We
will cover in detail the underlying factors, which enabled this case firm to use the Internet
as its sales channel, and how this reduced the negative effects of liability of foreignness and
resource scarcity. We examine factors such as customer and product characteristics, and how
the Internet decreased the effects of psychic distance by converting the case company into a
firm without a country of origin. The case study is outlined in such detail that the readers have
the opportunity to draw own conclusions and test the conclusions presented by the authors.
Theory
Liability of foreignness
Internationalising newly established firms suffer from a double liability, in which the liability
of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) is exacerbated by a liability of foreignness. In the literature
on multinational enterprises (Hymer, 1976), the liability of foreignness—the costs of doing
business abroad that result in a competitive disadvantage for an MNE sub-unit-have been
broadly defined as all additional costs a firm operating in a market overseas incurs that a
local firm would not incur. In general, the liability of foreignness can arise from at least four,
not necessarily independent, sources: (1) costs directly associated with spatial distance, such
as the costs of travel, transportation, and co-ordination over distance and across time zones;
(2) firm-specific costs based on a particular company’s unfamiliarity with and lack of roots in
a local environment; (3) costs resulting from the host country environment, such as the lack
of legitimacy of foreign firms and economic nationalism; (4) costs from the home country
environment, such as the restrictions on high-technology sales to certain countries (Zaheer,
1995). The liability of foreignness implies that foreign firms will have lower profitability
than local firms, all else being equal, and perhaps even a lower probability of survival.
Resource scarcity
New firms face the challenge of obtaining resources for survival and performance (Barney,
1991; Peteraf, 1993) and successful internationalisation (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994).
Differences in resource availability compared to large global competitors have been reported
as one of the major barriers to early internationalisation of new firms (Karagozoglu and
Springer
J Int Entrepr (2006) 3: 279–290 281
Lindell, 1998). The resource challenge involves around resource availability and access, and
uncertainty (Gulati and Singh, 1998). Resource availability involves the ability to identify
where the necessary resources are available, essentially focusing on search costs and diffi-
culties. Resource access involves a firm’s ability to acquire needed resources. Uncertainty
often makes access to resources problematic for new firms because other firms are reluctant
to exchange resources with a new firm that faces an uncertain and hazardous future (Gulati,
1998).
In this paper, we discuss how and when the Internet can be a resource-conserving interna-
tional entry mode. Research has found that new firms tend to internationalise a smaller per-
centage of their resources essential to their survival than mature organisations do (McDougall
et al., 1994). Crick and Jones found that most firms in their sample adopted a risk-averse
low-resource commitment strategy (Crick and Jones, 2000). For instance they often interna-
tionalised by solely exporting through overseas agents. Shrader et al. found that U.S. firms
controlled international risk by entering several countries using low resource consuming en-
try modes, thus maintaining a low dependence on any single foreign market (Shrader et al.,
2000). Usage of low resource consuming entry modes may be a conscious choice, and not
solely dictated by resource scarcity.
When firms have more resources, they can circumvent the pressure for slow and gradual re-
source commitment (Petersen and Pedersen, 1999). Alternatively, the firm must use resource-
conserving internationalisation modes. New firms use increasingly alternative transaction
governance structures, such as networks, in their internationalisation (Oviatt and McDougall,
1994). Due to their poverty of resources and negotiation power, new ventures may even use
such structures when the risk of asset expropriation by partners is high (ibib. 1994, p. 55).
Internet as sales channel
International entrepreneurship is a rather recent research area focusing mainly on the en-
trepreneur or the entrepreneurial firm in an international context (Dana et al., 1999). Internet
and its impact on international and global operation modes and sales channels is a relatively
unexplored area in international entrepreneurship (Dunning and Wymbs, 2001; Kotha et al.,
2001; Singh and Kundu, 2002).
We have therefore adopted concepts from the international business and marketing liter-
ature to discuss international sales channels and the Internet. The internationalisation stage
literature identifies two groups of marketing operations (a) export operations, such as indirect,
direct and own export and (b) marketing operations abroad, such as sales, sales promotion
or marketing subsidiaries established abroad (Luostarinen, 1979, 1970). Moreover, the mar-
keting literature identifies two main sales channel alternatives (a) indirect sales channels and
(b) direct sales channel (Hardy and Magrath, 1988).
Gabrielsson combined these two research streams into a model of international sales
channels (see Fig. 1) (Gabrielsson, 1999). He argued that companies should choose between
several operation strategies when expanding abroad. These can be, indirect export (i.e. through
a middleman at home), direct export (i.e. through a middleman in the host country), own
export (no middleman in the home or host country) or establishment of a sales, sales promotion
or marketing subsidiary. In addition, the company needs to select a sales channel strategy as
follows: direct, (the producer sells directly to the end-customer), or indirect, (the producer
sells through a channel middleman to the end-customer). Figure 1 below, has originally
been developed for traditional channels, but can easily be adopted also for Internet sales.
This in mind, Fig. 1 shows that the Internet can be used on three sales channel levels:
Springer
282 J Int Entrepr (2006) 3: 279–290
Fig. 1 Relation between international marketing operation modes and sales channels (Gabrielsson, 1999: 23)
(1) by the producers for exporting purposes; (2) by the foreign sales, promotion or marketing
subsidiaries; (3) by the channel members in sales and marketing.
The impact of the Internet on company configuration of international operation modes
and sales channels is overlooked in the literature, although, some researchers argue that the
impact can be significant (Gabrielsson et al., 2002). According to Porter, the strategies for
the Internet firm can concern either configurations of physical and virtual activities or a
concentration on segments where Internet-only model offers real advantage (Porter, 2001).
The chosen strategy of Internet as main distribution channel or complementing channel will
then reflect on the extent of which traditional international operation modes and sales channels
are selected.
The use of the Internet as an international distribution channel has expanded rapidly.
The variety and quality of content and ease of access through better technology show
constant improvement. A positive spiral has taken place. As more and more individu-
als hook up to the net, the true commercial potential is being explored. Security has
improved to the degree that many feel comfortable conducting business on the Internet;
companies such as Amazon.com and AOL are paving the way towards profitable Internet
business.
Methods
The empirical investigation of this paper was carried out as an explorative longitudinal single
case study of Futuremark Corporation. Single case study enabled us to build inductively
from data rather than deductively through theory testing. The case study’s strength is in
the likelihood of it resulting in theory development (Eisenhardt, 1989). The single case
study approach is recommended when the case represents an ‘extreme case’ or ‘revelatory
opportunity’ to analyse a phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific investigation (Yin,
1991).
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We have followed the internationalisation process of the case company over a period
of five years (1999–2003). During this time, we have interviewed people who have been
closely involved in the internationalisation process of the firm. The interviews have been
loosely structured, lasting between 60 and 150 minutes. Altogether, we have carried out
12 formal interviews and numerous informal discussions, both on phone and by e-mail
during 1999–2003. The case informants include both members of the case firm as well as
external informants, such as advisers, financiers, and customers.
Case: Futuremark corporation
The history of Futuremark started in the summer of 1997. VNU Business Publications, the
largest computer magazine publisher in Europe, had contacted Remedy Entertainment, a
young Finnish recreational game developer (e.g., Max Payne) to create software for testing
three-dimensional (3D) graphics capabilities of computers. Remedy considered the project
as a good opportunity to obtain some PR and to test their new products, and decided to go
ahead with the deal. Remedy’s benchmark software for the measurement of 3D capabilities—
‘Final Reality’—was launched in the form of CD-ROM supplements to computer magazines
in the summer of 1997. The software was a success—millions of copies were distributed
worldwide in a short time. Despite of the success, the software was seen to deviate from
the core business of the 3-year old Remedy Entertainment, thus it was spun-off to an in-
dependent firm. Therefore, in November 1997, Futuremark was established to capitalise
on the three-dimensional graphic benchmark software originally developed by Remedy
Entertainment.
It has been a high priority for Futuremark to acquire experience and know-how, not
only on the operational level, but also in upper management. Two key elements in this
strategy were Risto Siilasmaa and Artturi Tarjanne. In the spring of 1999, Risto Siilas-
maa bought a share in the company and became the chairman of the Board of Direc-
tors. Siilasmaa was the CEO, founder and part owner of F-Secure, one of the most suc-
cessful Finnish software companies to date. Artturi Tarjanne, a veteran of the industry,
who had acted as the company’s trusted advisor and consultant was also recruited to the
Board in 1999. The two co-founders, Aki Ja¨rvilehto, Managing Director, and Markus
Ma¨ki, Technology Manager, had a technological and business background and were soon
joined by a third partner, Nathan Harley, with marketing and business background. In
2001, Risto Vehvila¨inen, an IT veteran, with background in IT management and con-
sulting was appointed CEO and Aki Ja¨rvilehto took up the position as VP of Business
Development.
Futuremark’s headquarters is in Espoo, Finland with an office in California, USA.1 The
company aimed to become international from the beginning. It focused on the U.S. market
because it was considered the biggest market area, and their major clients and partners had
their headquarters there. The management perceived the U.S. market as the key for global
expansion. From its inception, Futuremark had a subsidiary in London and in 1998; the
office was moved to Toronto, Canada. Later on, in fall 2000 at the age of 3 years, Futuremark
established a sales subsidiary in California, and at the same time, it initiated the shut down
of the Toronto office.
1 Originally Futuremark planned to include other activities at its California office, but decided eventually to
concentrate only on sales and marketing. The reason behind concentrating all R&D activities to Finland was
the fact that it’s a good place for technology companies and the company considered the U.S. rather expensive.
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The following case description is divided into three periods, based on the development
of Futuremark’s international operations and sales channels: Phase 1 (1997–1999), Phase 2
(1999–2001) and Phase 3 (2001–Present).
Phase 1 (1997–1999): Based on Remedy’s successful Final Reality benchmark, Future-
mark launched 3DMark 99—the gamers’ benchmark—in October 1998. This was available
on the company’s Internet site, from which it could be downloaded free of charge. In two
years, Futuremark was able to distribute 8 million copies of the software. It had been primarily
distributed as supplemental CD-ROM to computer magazines (6.0 million in 18 countries),
but increasingly also through the Internet (1.3 million, worldwide). The distribution of utility
and recreational software CD-ROMs as magazine attachments was common practice among
software and computer magazines. Futuremark received a modest per unit compensation
from the publisher and the end user received the CD-ROM free of charge.
Futuremark’s software was highly specialised and was targeted as a standardised measure
of computers’ 3D capabilities. The product enjoyed a competitive advantage against rather
expensive and heavy computer memory-requiring competitors’ products, which could not be
afforded by private users. Its main competing product 3Dwinbench (owned by Ziff-Davis,
the world’s largest publisher of IT magazines) was more expensive and much larger, and thus
unloadable from the Internet.
In addition to 3DMark, Futuremark produced demonstration software (demos) based on
OEM assignments to hardware producers. The demos contributed half of the sales in 1999,
but this segment did not grow as fast as expected. In addition, a trade off was evident as
the demos tied up resources from the core business of benchmark development outlined in
the business plan. The increasing PC penetration rate and a boom in Internet connections
were creating an exponential demand for benchmarking services. One Internet subscription
could actually mean multiple users as more than one person used the connection at home
or at work. Thus, Futuremark had identified a growing business segment, the consumers
interested in Internet purchasing. In 1999, the cash flow from the benchmarking business,
or rather the lack of it was not considered to be crucial. The key to profitability and larger
revenues was in the commercial exploitation of an established standard, a ‘dominant de-
sign,’ in the marketplace. The potential in this area was considered so high that it was
perceived to be an attractive approach, even if it resulted in loss-making operations in the
short-term.
During 1999, Futuremark attracted external financing first from a group of business angels,
and later in the year from Conventum Limited, a Finnish investment bank with a venture
capital portfolio. These investments enabled Futuremark to launch new businesses in the
U.S. Futuremark’s products were bundled with original equipment manufacturer’s (OEMs)
offerings, where the software would be available with the hardware it supported, that is,
graphics drivers.
Phase 2 (1999–2001): Futuremark provided on its web site access to the benchmarking
software as well as access to an online performance database, assisting users in upgrading their
computers. New areas included links to vendors’ pages, sponsoring and online advertising.
Advertisements had become more commonplace on the Internet, what was once considered
a puritanically non-commercial environment. Advertisers paid for advertisement space as in
any conventional media. The net had provided access to specific target segments. Legitimate
concerns existed about privacy and the security of financial transactions, but the consensus
seemed to be that any hurdles would be overcome. With a targeted “audience” that had
grown from 14 million distributed copies in 1999 to 30 million in 2003, Futuremark had
access to a large and attractive customer segment, which provided a large captive audience
for advertisers seeking to target this segment, and provided Futuremark with a potential for
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advertising revenue. Advertisement revenue at the time was negligible and was considered a
“bonus”.
In spring 2001, Conventum and Nexit Ventures made their second joint-investment in the
company and invested 2 million, in addition to their 2.5 million the year before, to
be used for R&D on PC performance information and web services. This round of funding
secured the position to continue intense R&D and at the same time accelerate licensing based
revenues from the Recommendation Engine technology in the international market. In addi-
tion to graphical (3DMark) and computer (PCMark) performance benchmarking software,
the company produced in 2000 and 2001 new software products that were able to measure
audio and video performance. The target was to build a family of benchmark products that
would be able to measure all relevant user computer performance, and hopefully tie the users
to Futuremark services. In the end, this should be converted into financial gain. In 1999,
Futuremark formed a strategic alliance with BABCo (Business Applications Performance
Corporation),2 which enabled the expansion of the product range into audio benchmarking.
Radio stations were available on the net and people were already listening to music. Products
such as SysMark, WebMark and MobileMark were the result of the alliance.
The company applied a dual strategy on the Internet. A simpler version of the program
was available free of charge on the Internet, and for the more advanced versions there was a
charge. Thus, customers were able to familiarise themselves with the product before buying
it. According to the interviewees, the benefits of selling on the Internet were various. The
audience was captive; i.e. looked at their screens as they downloaded the software. The
Internet might also grab attention more effectively than direct sales pitches and advertising
leaflets in the mail. In addition, the medium provided high potential for product demonstration
and ease of purchase (click a few times with the mouse and enter a credit card number). The
reproduction costs of CD-ROMs were small and the cost of downloading the software from
the net was minuscule, as users paid for the on-line time to the service provider. Often such
on-line time was set at a fixed rate and thus the user incurred no additional charges. There
was very little cost for the user of Futuremark’s software and high potential utility.
Phase 3 (2001–present): Futuremark has been constantly forced, but also able to refocus its
business strategy. The Internet-based Business-to-Consumer business idea from 1999 proved
to be unprofitable, marketing on the Internet to large consumer groups turned out to be too
expensive for a small company. However, sales to Internet consumers is still generating 20%
of Futuremark’s turnover and is important in terms of product development, chat groups and
fans. Futuremark’s site has several hundred thousand frequent users. Although, no specific
market data existed about the personal profile of 3DMark users, technical information about
users’ computers is, detailed and stored in a database, to date 7 million. Today, the database is
proven most valuable for business users as an analysis tool. In the past, PC manufacturers were
forced to use different benchmark software to measure performance of different computer
types. PCMark is providing both consumers and business users a unified benchmarking
tool.
To date, with sales exceeding 30 million copies, 3DMark has become the global de facto
standard and a market leader in benchmarking 3D technologies. For example 2.5 million
copies of 3DMark launched in February 2003 were downloaded in a month. Hardware man-
ufacturers as well as some 500 PC magazines and online publication worldwide use 3Dmark.
2 BABCo a non-profit consortium. BABCo’s charter is to develop and distribute a set of objective performance
benchmarks based on popular/personal computer applications and industry operating systems. BABCo’s cur-
rent members include: CNET Labs, Inc, Compaq, Dell, HP, IBM, Intel, Microsoft and VNU Business Publi-
cations Ltd. (UK).
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It is likely that Futuremark will continue to dominate the 3D benchmarking software market.
However, it will remain to see whether Futuremark can combine growth with profitability.
Futuremark has extended its pure Business-to-Consumer Internet strategy towards a
Business-to-Business Internet strategy. The company has been divided into two distinct
business units to better focus their scarce resources. The Measurement Services introduced
a Performance Analyzer, an online service that enables PC shoppers to with a click of the
button know exactly how much the adding of a new graphic processing unit will improve per-
formance. This has opened up a new level of license revenues from the distributors and online
resellers of PCs and related equipments. Among others, PNY uses the Performance Analyzer
on its site to market its memory and graphic cards, and NVIDIA for information collection
and processing in their solutions. Futuremark’s Beta Partner Program connects 16 leading
PC, processor and other component manufacturers that have interest in joint-development
and -testing of performance benchmark programs.3 Through the program Futuremark is able
to keep up with the development in new hardware, and to produce up-to-date benchmarking
software.
The current strategy includes multiple revenue streams and has shifted from Business-
to-Consumers towards Business-to-Business derived incomes in accordance with changes in
business opportunities. Futuremark has evolved from a benchmarking software developer to a
value-adding technology service provider. The main focus of the firm is in benchmarking soft-
ware and services to corporate and end-user customers. In addition, Futuremark is providing
services to IT industry companies. It provides them an online performance analysing tools,
which enable these firms to provide enhanced customer support.
Global sales (outside Europe) have developed rapidly within three years to over 70% of
the total turnover. Company estimates indicate that in 2003 almost all of the revenue would
come from outside Europe.
Analysis and discussion on the case
Futuremark is a typical Internet firm and fulfil the characteristics summarised by Singh and
Kundu (2002): multinational/global from inception (70% of sales outside its own conti-
nent within three years, today nearly all); world-wide competition (mainly European and
North-American competition); SMEs that complement strategic assets through networks of
partnerships and alliances (co-operation with BABCo and the Beta program); unique ad-
vantages based on network resources, open accessibility, innovative entrepreneurship, and
information sharing.
Futuremark’s business strategy development can be divided into three phases: Phase 1
(1997–1999): Benchmark software distributed mainly through indirect sales channels as
supplemental CD-ROMs attached to computer magazines, and a smaller part through di-
rect sales derived from the Internet and OEM assignments by hardware producers. Phase 2
(1999–2001): Benchmark software distributed increasingly to consumers on the Internet—a
direct sales channel. Phase 3 (2001–present): Benchmark software and services increasingly
distributed to corporate customers, which utilise the Internet to promote their business-an
indirect sales channel for Futuremark. Today, Futuremark is using multiple sales channels
on the Internet, but the indirect sales channel is the dominant.
3 Futuremark’s Beta Program include: AMD, ATI, Beyond3D, CNET, Creative Technologies, Dell, Extreme
Tech (Ziff-Davis), Gateway, Imagination Technologies/PowerVR, Innovision Multimedia, Intel, Microsoft,
NVIDIA, S3Graphics, Transmeta and XGI Technology.
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Internet as sales channels has been instrumental in Futuremark’s globalisation process.
Without this dynamic electronic marketplace Futuremark would have been forced to invest
heavily in marketing to be able to grow. The company would probably have been forced to use
other strategic alternatives, e.g., using traditional agents and importers, thus slowing down
the globalisation process. By using the Internet, Futuremark has been able to minimise the
need for developing different international operation modes. The company has established
only few foreign international sales subsidiaries, and even their role has been mainly in sales
promotion and networking with other industry players, and no other operation modes have
been called for.
By using the Internet as sales channel, Futuremark has decreased its liability of foreignness.
First, the Internet has decreased the costs directly associated with spatial distance. Once
being developed, it is possible to distribute a software product to different countries using the
Internet without any additional cost per unit of downloaded or distributed software. Internet
as sales channel also decreased travel costs, which are among the first category of sources
of liability of foreignness. Second, using the Internet as sales channel also decreased the
costs resulting from the host country environment, such as the lack of legitimacy of foreign
firms and economic nationalism. It has been proposed that Internet make firms stateless, thus
removing the source of economic nationalism (perception of being alike).
Futuremark also decreased its liability of foreignness by moving from the Business-to-
Consumer to Business-to-Business market. By dealing with smaller groups, Futuremark
was able to get increased added value from each business transaction. Internet as sales and
distribution channel is resource conserving. By using the Internet, knowledge intensive new
firms should be able to approach more market areas simultaneously, without the threat of
distributing their resources too thinly on too many markets.
Internet is an effective tool to create market pull for a software product by raising the
company’s profile and getting other people talk about it, which is often called building mind-
share. Because marketing is all about creating perceptions about a product in the minds of
the customers, the battle for mind-share is critical for success.
Fig. 2 Proposed model.
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Based on the case evidence, we propose a model on how the use of Internet sales channels
influences the speed of internationalisation (Fig. 2). As the model in Fig. 2 suggests we pro-
pose a negative relationship between liability of foreignness and speed of internationalisation.
Furthermore, we propose a negative relationship between resource scarcity and speed of in-
ternationalisation. However, we expect usage of Internet as sales channel to counter moderate
both these relationships, and thus to influence positively the speed of internationalisation.
Faster speed of internationalisation is expected for firms facing liability of foreignness and
resource scarcity that are using the Internet as sales channel than for those that are not using
the Internet.
Conclusions
This research explores a relatively new phenomenon, the Internet and its role in decreasing
liability of foreignness and resource scarcity. We have integrated two theoretical perspec-
tives to explain the speed of internationalisation of knowledge intensive new firms. We have
demonstrated how the traditional internationalisation literature can contribute to the litera-
ture on international entrepreneurship (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994). The integration of the
theories moves us to better understanding the rapidly internationalising knowledge intensive
new firm and should be explored further.
The implications for the entrepreneurship literature are several. In international en-
trepreneurship research, speed of internationalisation has attracted much attention (Zahra
and George, 2001). To capture the potential of knowledge advantage, a firm must move fast
in the international markets (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994; Preece et al., 1999). In this paper
we have examined a particular form of international activities, namely the use of the Internet,
and how it can influence the speed of internationalisation. We have showed how the Internet
can provide a mean to decrease the effects of liability of foreignness and resource scarcity,
and herewith contribute to an increased speed of internationalisation.
The use of the Internet may have an influence across several process variables of interna-
tionalisation. Contrary to Preece et al, who argued that variables drawn from the international
entrepreneurship literature would affect international intensity and global diversity differently
(Preece et al., 1999), we propose that the use of Internet has the potential to increase both
the international intensity and the global diversity of the knowledge intensive firm. Using the
Internet, these firms appear to compensate the lack of critical mass in international experience
and business development.
Our paper also has implications for internationalisation literature. Internet is a novel
sales channel. Traditionally firms have internationalised stage-wise using several oper-
ation modes sequentially and expanded slowly to international markets (Johanson and
Vahlne, 1977; Luostarinen, 1979). Recent research in this area seems to indicate that
international new ventures do not follow the incremental stages of internationalisation
(Luostarinen and Gabrielsson, 2004; McDougall et al., 1994). This is, however, a great
entrepreneurial challenge, and little has been written on the practical solutions of how
to actually do it. We believe that the Internet can simplify the internationalisation path
and the marketing organisation structure necessary for conducting international business.
For example, with the Internet the need to be physically in touch with the customers is
reduced.
Our conclusion is that the Internet can have two different impacts on the company’s
international marketing operation mode and sales channel. A firm can apply a traditional
international marketing operation and sales channel strategy based on Fig. 1, where Internet
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is a complementing sales channel. This can reduce the resources and functions conducted
by the sales and marketing subsidiaries in target markets. Alternatively, a firm can apply
the Internet as the main sales channel and use international marketing modes selectively, for
example in countries where there is a substantial time difference between home and host
country.
The authors recommend additional studies investigating how knowledge intensive new
ventures can apply the Internet in their internationalisation process. Empirical survey research
should also be conducted to verify the results and the proposed model of this study. Also,
the use of the Internet on sales channel levels deserves more attention. The authors welcome
comments from other scholars and practitioners.
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